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Bureau  of  railway  economics 
The  arguments  for  and  against  train-crew  legislatior 


¥-^i-5G 


THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 

LOS  ANGELES 


BUREAU  OF  RAILWAY  ECONOMICS 


Established  by  Railways  of  the  United  States 
for  the  Scientific  Study  of  Transportation  Problems 


LOGAN  G.  Mcpherson  frank  haigh  dixon 

DIRECTOR  CHICr  STATItTICIilN 


The  Arguments  For  and  Against 
Train-Crew  Legislation 


library 

.1 
■lifornia 


lil3rary    -■  - 
I^st-ltnte  of  industrial  Bela>.ioT.s 


OvAv^    ^^   H^>oaAvi5 


BuUefln  No.  53 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C. 

1913 


BULLETINS  OF  THE 
BXTBEAU  OF  RAILWAY  ECONOMICS 

1.  Summary  of  Revenues  and  Expenses  of  Steam  Roads  la  the  United  States 

for  July,  1910.     (Monthly  Report  Series,  Bulletin  No.  1.) 

2.  Summary  of  Revenues  and  Expenses  of  Steam  Roads  in  the  United  States 

for  August,  1910.     (Monthly  Report  Series,  Bulletin  No.  2.) 

3.  Summary  of  Revenues  and  Expenses  of  Steam  Roads  In  the  United  States 

for  September,  1910.     (Monthly  Report  Series,  Bulletin  No.  3.) 

4.  A  Comparative  Statement  of  Physical  Valuation  and  Capitalization. 

5.  Preliminary  Bulletin  for  November,  1910 — Revenues  and  Expenses. 

6.  Railway  Traffic  Statistics,  1900-1909.     (See  No.  31.) 

7.  Summary  of  Revenues  and  Expenses  of  Steam  Roads  in  the  United  States 

for  October,  1910.     (Monthly  Report  Series,  Bulletin  No.  4.) 

8.  Summary  of  Revenues  and  Expenses  of  Steam  Roads  in  the  United  States 

for  November,  1910.     (Monthly  Report  Series,  Bulletin  No.  5.) 

9.  Summary  of  Revenues  and  Expenses  of  Steam  Roads  in  the  United  States 

for  December,  1910.     (Monthly  Report  Series,  Bulletin  No.  6.) 

10.  Summary  of  Revenues  and  Expenses  of  Steam  Roads  in  the  United  States 

for  January,  1911. 

11.  (Out  of  Print) 

12.  Summary  of  Revenues  and  Expenses  of  Steam  Roads  in  the  United  States 

for  February,  1911. 

13.  Summary  of  Revenues  and  Expenses  of  Steam  Roads  in  the  United  States 

for  March,  1911. 

14.  Summary  of  Revenues  and  Expenses  of  Steam  Roads  in  the  United  Stiites 

for  April,  1911. 

15.  The  Conflict  Between  Federal  and  State  Regulation  of  the  Railways. 

16.  Summarr  of  Revenues  and  Expenses  of  Steam  Roads  In  the  United  States 

for  May,  1911. 

17.  (Out  of  Print) 

18.  (Out  of  print) 

19.  Summary  of  Revenues  and  Expenses  of  Steam  Roads  in  the  United  States 

for  June,  1911. 

20.  Summary  of  Revenues  and  Expenses  of  Steam  Roads  in  the  United  States 

for  July,  1911. 

21.  The  Cost  of  Transportation  on  the  Eri©  Canal  and  by  Rail. 

22.  Summary  of  Revenues  and  Expenses  of  Steam  Roads  in  the  United  States 

for  August,  1911. 

23.  (Out  of  print) 

34.  Comparative  Railway  Statistics  of  the  United  States,  the  United  King- 
dom, Franoe,  and  Germany. 

25.  Summary  of  Revenues  and  Expenses  «C  Steam  Roads  in  the  United  States 

for  September,  1911. 

26.  Summary  of  Revenues  and  Expenses  of  Steam  Roads  In  the  United  State« 

for  October,  1911. 

27.  Summarj'  of  Revenues  and  Expenses  of  Steam  Roads  In  the  United  States 

for  November,  1911. 

(Continued  to  -page  3  of  cover.) 


The  Arguments  For  and  Against 
Train-Crew  Legislation 


WASHINGTON.  D.  C. 
Odober.  1913 


HE 
l?OI 

CONTENTS. 


Page 

Introduction   3 

Changing  Conditions  of  Train  Operation 6 

Development  of  Air-Brakes  and  Automatic  Couplers 7 

Increase  in  Trainloads •'""o-' 

Train  Crews  under  Present  Conditions > 

Passenger  Service 11 

Freight  Service 12 

Effects  of  Train-crew  Legislation 15 

Increase  of  Operating  Expenses 15 

Issues  Involved  in  Train-crew  Legislation 18 

Number  of  Trainmen  for  Work  Performed 20 

Train  Crews  and  Accidents 23 

Accidents  to  Trainmen  during  the  Year  1912 23 

In  Connection  with  Train  Operation 23 

In  Connection  with  Train  Accidents 25 

Accidents  to  Trainmen  from  1901  to  1912 26 

Accidents  to  Long  Freight  Trains 30 

Accidents  to  all  Persons 31 

Train-crew  Legislation  as  Affecting  the   Provision  of  Safety 

Appliances  33 

Train-crew  Legislation  Vetoed  by  Governors 34 

Governor  Cruce's  Veto  Message — 1913 34 

Governor  Hughes'  Veto  Message — 1907 35 

Governor  Dix's  Veto  Message — 191 1 36 

Governor  Foss's  Veto  Message — 191 2 36 

Addendum   37 


841179 


INTRODUCTION. 

Within  recent  years,  numerous  bills  to  regulate  the  number  of  men 
that  railways  must  employ  in  their  train  crews  have  been  introduced 
in  the  state  legislatures  and  in  Congress.  These  measures  are  com- 
monly known  as  "full-crew  bills."  They  specify,  sometimes  the 
number  of  men  that  must  be  employed  on  passenger  trains ;  some- 
times the  number  of  men  that  must  be  employed  on  freight  trains ; 
sometimes  the  number  that  must  be  employed  in  switching  service ; 
and  sometimes  the  number  that  must  be  employed  in  all  of  these 
classes  of  service.  Such  measures  have  become  laws  in  twenty 
States,  namely,  Arizona,  Arkansas,  California,  Connecticut,  Indi- 
ana, Maryland,  Missouri,  Nebraska,  Maine,  Nevada,  New  Jersey, 
New  York,  North  Dakota,  Ohio,  Oregon,  Pennsylvania,  South  Caro- 
lina, Texas,  Washington,  and  Wisconsin.  In  some  cases  they  merely 
require  the  employment  of  the  number  of  men  that  it  is  customary 
for  the  railways  to  employ,  existing  practice  not  being  affected.  In 
at  least  twelve  States  these  laws  compel  the  employment  of  addi- 
tional men.  Within  the  last  four  years,  eight  bills  have  been  pre- 
sented in  Congress,  each  of  which  would  have  compelled  the  em- 
ployment of  more  men ;  but  no  federal  train-crew  law  has  yet  been 
enacted. 

The  first  efforts  to  secure  train-crew  legislation  date  back  a  num- 
ber of  years,  and  these  efforts  have  been  continued  with  great  energy 
and  perseverance.  For  example,  a  bill  was  introduced  in  the  Massa- 
chusetts Legislature  in  1902  and  defeated.  It  was  again  introduced 
in  1903  and  1904  and  defeated  in  both  years.  It  reappeared  in  1908. 
On  this  occasion  the  legislature  referred  the  whole  matter  to  the 
State  Railroad  Commission  for  investigation.  The  commission, 
after  inquiry,  reported  that  if  the  officers  of  the  railways  would  see 
that  the  provisions  of  the  Standard  Code  of  operating  rules  were  en- 
forced, and  make  some  changes  in  methods  locally,  legislation  would 
be  unnecessary.  The  bill  was  again  introduced  in  1909  and  defeated. 
It  was  again  introduced  in  1912,  and  this  time  was  passed  by  both 
houses.  Governor  Foss  vetoed  it ;  whereupon  an  unsuccessful  at- 
tempt was  made  to  pass  it  over  his  veto.  Later,  the  Board  of  Rail- 
road Commissioners  issued  several  recommendations  regarding  the 
manning  of  trains,  with  which  all  the  roads  at  once  complied. 


Both  state  and  federal  bills  have  been  introduced  from  time  to 
time  at  the  instance  of  railway  labor  organizations,  the  chief  pro- 
moter of  such  legislation  being  the  Brotherhood  of  Railroad  Train- 
men. The  legislative  representatives  of  the  brotherhoods  have  re- 
peatedly announced  that  their  members  vvrould  vote  against  law- 
makers who  did  not  support  the  measures  they  demanded.  Many 
members  of  the  Brotherhood  itself  have  not  favored,  or  have 
been  opposed  to,  the  proposed  legislation.  But  opposition  on  their 
part  is  now  stopped  by  a  resolution  of  the  Brotherhood  to  the  effect 
that  its  members  cannot  sign  petitions  against  labor  legislation,  "nor 
interfere  with  the  work  of  their  legislative  representatives,  without 
violating  the  law  of  the  Brotherhood,  which  would  mean  expulsion 
for  the  offending  party."^ 

The  labor  brotherhoods  and  the  members  of  state  legislatures 
and  of. Congress  who  have  favored  such  legislation  have  advocated 
it  chiefly  on  the  ground  that  the  employment  of  more  men  in  train 
service  is  necessaryto  the  safety  of  railway  employees  and  passengers. 
Such  legislation  has  been  opposed  by  officers  of  the  railways,  by 
many  commercial  and  agricultural  organizations,  and  by  many  mem- 
bers of  state  legislatures  and  of  Congress  on  the  ground  that  it  does 
not  increase  the  efficiency  or  safety  of  railway  operation  or  otherwise 
benefit  the  public,  and  hence  that  it  does  add  unnecessarily  to  rail- 
way expenses.  Therefore,  railway  managers  have  in  several  cases 
urged  state  governors  to  veto  such  measures.  In  New  York  and 
Missouri  the  governors,  notwithstanding  earnest  protests  from  rail- 
way officers,  signed  the  bills  as  passed  by  the  legislatures  and  issued 
statements  indicating  their  belief  that  they  would  promote  safety  and 
were  therefore  in  the  public  interest.^  On  the  other  hand,  Governor 
Sulzer's  two  immediate  predecessors,  Governors  Hughes  and  Dix, 
vetoed  train-crew  bills  that  had  been  passed  by  the  New  York 
legislature.  Governor  Cruce  of  Oklahoma,  Governor  Foss  of 
Massachusetts,  and  Governor  Harmon  of  Ohio  also  have  vetoed 
similar  bills,  on  the  ground  that  general  legislation  requiring  the 
railways  to  employ  additional  men  on  trains  was  undesirable.  But 
in  all  except  Massachusetts  and  Oklahoma  subsequent  enactments 


'From  "The  Railroad  Trainman,"  the  official  publication  of  the  Brotherhood 
of  Railroad  Trainmen,  for  May,  1913,  p.  465. 

^  In  Missouri  the  railroads  circulated  a  referendum  petition,  and  secured 
enough  signatures  to  have  the  measure  submitted  to  a  vote  of  the  people, 
which  cannot  be  taken  before  October,  1914. 


have  been  approved.  A  number  of  state  legislatures  have  also  re- 
fused to  pass  train-crew  bills :  of  these  are  the  legislatures  of  Colo- 
rado, Delaware,  Florida,  Georgia,  Illinois,  Iowa,  Kansas,  Kentucky, 
Louisiana,  Michigan.  Minnesota,  Mississippi,  Montana,  New  Hamp- 
shire, New  Mexico,  North  Carolina,  South  Dakota,  Tennessee,  Utah, 
Virginia,  West  Virginia,  and  Wyoming. 

In  a  movement  concerning  which  there  is  such  wide  diversity  of 
opinion  it  is  desirable  that  there  should  be  the  fullest  information 
as  to  the  views  both  of  those  who  advocate  and  of  those  who  oppose 
such  legislation.  In  the  following  pages  there  is  presented  the  his- 
tory and  present  status  of  train  operation,  out  of  which  has  grown 
the  demand  for  "full  crew"  legislation,  the  provisions  of  the  meas- 
ures enacted  and  proposed,  the  expense  resulting  from  the  legisla- 
tion already  passed  as  estimated  by  the  railways,  the  estimated  ex- 
pense of  proposed  legislation,  and  a  discussion  of  the  effect  of  such 
legislation  upon  the  efficiency  and  safety  of  transportation. 


CHANGING  CONDITIONS  OF  TRAIN  OPERATION. 

Until  within  a  comparatively  recent  time  trains  were  ordinarily 
made  up  at  the  point  of  origin  by  the  same  employees  who  subse- 
quently handled  them  on  the  road.  The  trainmen  switched  the  cars 
into  place,  coupled  them,  and  did  all  the  work  necessary  to  prepare 
the  train  for  its  run,  including  the  inspection  of  its  condition  before 
starting.  Cars  were  coupled  to  each  other  and  to  the  engine  by  the 
link  and  pin  couplers.  Brakemen  had  to  carry  links  and  pins  to 
supply  couplers  lacking  them,  and  to  carry  those  unused  back  to  the 
caboose  or  engine. .  Coupling  had  to  be  efifected  by  hand,  for  which 
purpose  the  employees  had  to  go  between  the  cars.  Trains  were 
controlled  entirely  by  hand-brakes,  which  had  to  be  worked  from 
the  tops  of  freight  cars  and  from  the  platforms  of  passenger  cars. 
Practically  all  trains  rendered  local  as  well  as  through  service — that 
is,  they  not  only  carried  through  traffic  between  large  terminals,  but 
also  stopped  at  stations  along  the  line  to  put  off  and  take  on  goods 
or  passengers.  When  a  car  was  taken  out  of  a  train  or  taken  into  a 
train  at  one  of  these  local  stations,  it  was  necessary  to  use  the  hand- 
brake in  the  switching  needed  to  make  the  requisite  changes.  The 
work  of  trainmen  at  that  time  was  hard  and  hazardous.  The  num- 
ber of  cars  in  a  train  was  considerable.  More  than  thirty  years  ago, 
before  the  introduction  of  air-brakes,  it  was  the  custom  of  many 
railroads  to  handle  regularly  freight  trains  of  forty  cars  or  more 
with  two  brakemen.  That  is,  the  crew  of  a  freight  train,  aside  from 
employees  on  the  engine,  usually  consisted  of  a  conductor  and  two 
brakemen.  The  labor  of  controlling  the  train  exposed  the  brake- 
men  to  all  kinds  of  weather  and  involved  strenuous  physical  exer- 
tion, for  the  application  of  hand-brakes  sufficient  to  hold  a  train 
often  required  both  strength  and  quickness  of  action.  The  brake- 
men  had  to  spend  most  of  their  time  on  the  tops  of  the  cars,  which 
in  winter  were  often  slippery  with  ice.  Going  between  cars  to 
couple  by  hand  necessarily  involved  danger,  so  that  accidents  to 
trainmen  were  numerous.  Passenger  cars  were  heated  by  wood  and 
coal  stoves,  which  it  was  the  brakemen's  duty  to  take  care  of. 


(6) 


Development  of  Air-brakes  and  Automatic  Couplers. 

In  1868,  the  first  successful  application  of  air-brakes  to  passenger 
trains  was  made.  In  July,  1886,  and  in  May,  1887,  the  Master  Car 
Builders  Association  held  a  series  of  competitive  trials,  with  the 
result  that  the  air-brake  was  found  to  be  as  adaptable  to  freight 
trains  as  to  passenger  trains.  Its  use  in  freight  service  was  there- 
after rapidly  extended. 

The  principle  of  the  air-brake  is  simple.  Cylinders  under  eich 
car  are  filled  with  compressed  air,  which,  when  released,  rushes 
into  adjoining  cylinders,  where,  through  connecting  mechanism,  it 
forces  brake-shoes  upon  the  wheels,  thus  bringing  the  train  to  a 
stop.  These  cylinders  are  supplied  with  air  by  a  continuous  line  of 
air-pipe  and  hose  leading  from  the  locomotive.  Application  of  the 
brakes  is  thus  effected  by  the  engineer.  Moreover,  any  disconnec- 
tion of  the  train  line  at  any  place  in  its  length,  as  when  a  train 
breaks  in  two,  automatically  applies  the  brakes.  There  are  also 
''conductors'  valves"  in  each  passenger  car,  and  in  the  caboose  of 
each  freight  train,  by  means  of  which  the  brakes  may  be  applied. 

In  1887,  the  Master  Car  Builders  Association,  after  several  years 
of  investigation,  recommended  a  standard  type  of  automatic  coupler. 
In  1890  the  type  that  had  become  known  as  the  "Master  Car  Build- 
ers Freight  Coupler"  was  recognized  as  standard  by  the  railroad 
companies  of  the  United  States  through  their  official  organization, 
the  American  Railway  Association.  In  order,  however,  to  com- 
pel the  adoption  of  a  standard  type  of  coupler  by  all  of  the  railways 
of  the  United  States,  there  was  federal  legislation.  In  1893  the 
Railway  Safety  Appliance  Act  was  adopted.  This  law  provided 
that  after  January  i,  1898,  it  should  be  unlawful  for  any  common 
carrier  to  use  in  interstate  commerce  any  car  "not  equipped  with 
couplers  coupling  automatically  by  impact,  and  which  can  be  un- 
coupled without  the  necessity  of  men  going  between  the  ends  of  the 
cars."  It  also  provided  that  it  should  be  unlawful  for  any  carrier 
to  use  in  interstate  commerce  any  locomotive  "not  equipped  with 
the  power  driving  wheel  brake,  and  appliances  for  operating  the 
train-brake  system,  or  to  run  any  train  in  such  traffic  after  said 
date  that  has  not  a  sufficient  number  of  cars  in  it  so  equipped  with 
power  or  train  brakes  that  the  engineer  on  the  locomotive  drawing 
such  train  can  control  its  speed  without  requiring  brakemen  to  use 


8 

the  common  hand-brake  for  that  purpose."  The  law  was  amended 
in  1903  to  provide  that  at  least  50  per  cent  of  the  cars  in  a  train 
should  be  controlled  by  air-brakes  applied  from  the  engine,  and 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  was  authorized  from  time  to 
time,  after  full  hearing,  to  "increase  the  minimum  percentage  of 
cars  in  any  train  required  to  be  operated  with  power  or  train  brakes 
which  must  have  train  brakes  used  and  operated  as  aforesaid."  The 
commission  subsequently  increased  to  75  per  cent  the  proportion  of 
cars  in  a  train  on  which  power  brakes  must  be  operative,  and  on 
September  i,  1910,  raised  this  minimum  to  85  per  cent. 

In  consequence  of  these  requirements,  the  use  of  automatic  coup- 
lers and  train  brakes  has  become  practically  universal  in  the  United 
States.  For  the  fiscal  year  ending  June  30,  191 1,  there  were  98.79 
per  cent  of  the  locomotives  and  cars  fitted  with  train  brakes  and 
99.56  per  cent  fitted  with  automatic  couplers.  Today  it  is  very  ex- 
ceptional for  a  train  to  have  any  cars  that  are  not  equipped  with  air 
brakes. 

These  improvements  in  equipment  have  had  a  far-reaching  effect 
upon  the  work  of  railway  trainmen.  The  engineer  of  a  train, 
whether  passenger  or  freight,  is  now  its  real  brakeman  and,  save 
under  exceptional  conditions,  sets  and  releases  the  brakes  from 
his  cab  on  the  engine.  The  "brakemen,"  so  called,  seldom  have  any- 
thing to  do  with  the  brakes  except  on  detached  cars  during  switch- 
ing operations.  Indeed,  the  term  "brakeman"  is  now  a  misnomer 
and  is  being  displaced  in  railway  usage  by  the  term  "trainman." 
The  general  substitution  of  the  automatic  coupler  for  the  old  link 
and  pin  has  changed  the  character  of  the  trainman's  work  in  coup- 
ling and  uncoupling  and  has  very  greatly  diminished  the  hazard. 
Indeed,  railway  managers  claim  that,  if  the  trainmen  comply  with 
their  instructions,  the  hazard  is  eliminated  entirely.  Formerly,  when 
coupling  cars,  the  brakeman  had  to  stand  between  the  cars  at  the 
moment  of  their  coming  together  in  order  to  guide  the  link  into  its 
place.  This  entailed  great  risk  of  having  his  hand  crushed,  as  well 
as  of  being  thrown  down  and  run  over.  Now,  any  necessary  adjust- 
ment of  the  coupler  can  be  made,  and  ought  to  be  made,  before  the 
cars  are  put  in  motion  to  effect  the  coupling.  Formerly,  when  un- 
coupling, the  brakeman  had  to  stand  between  the  cars  to  remove  the 
pin.  Now,  the  pin  that  locks  the  coupling  can  be  removed  by  a  rod 
extending  to  the  side  of  the  car.     Thus  during  neither  the  coupling 


nor  the  uncoupling  does  the  trainman  need  to  stand  between  the  cars. 
These  changes  apply  to  both  freight  and  passenger  cars.  How 
greatly  they  have  reduced  the  hazard  of  coupling  and  uncoupling 
cars  is  indicated  by  the  following  table : 

Casualties  to  Trainmen  from  Coupling  Accidents  1890  and  1910. 


Total 
number  of 
trainmen. 

Total 
killed. 

Total 

injiiied. 

Number 
killed  for 
each  1(1,000 
trainmen. 

Number 
injured  for 
each  lO.OCO 
trainmen. 

153.235 

26s 

6,073    . 

17 

400 

318,632 

174 

2,826 

5 

88 

In  addition  to  the  changes  in  their  work  directly  resulting  from 
the  introduction  of  air-brakes  and  automatic  couplers,  there  have 
been  other  modifications  in  the  duties  of  trainmen  which  may  be 
briefly  noted.  In  the  first  place,  the  train  crew  as  a  rule  no  longer 
makes  up  and  inspects  the  train  at  terminals.  Switching  crews  now 
make  up  all  trains  at  all  important  points  of  origin  and,  after  they 
have  been  inspected  by  inspectors  employed  for  that  purpose,  de- 
liver them  to  the  train  crew  ready  for  operation.  The  train  crew 
has  no  more  to  do  with  the  preparation  for  the  run  than  to  test  the 
brakes.  At  the  end  of  the  run  the  train  crew  has  only  to  deliver  a 
train  to  the  switching  crews,  which  separate  the  cars  for  further 
disposition.  It  may  also  be  noted  that  the  work  and  responsibility 
of  freight  conductors  en  route  has  been  lightened  by  the  present 
practice  whereunder  a" yard  clerk  furnishes  them  a  statement  of  the 
cars  in  the  train,  with  the  respective  destinations,  from  which  the 
conductor  checks  off  each  car  as  it  is  set  out  and  to  which  he  adds 
other  cars  as  they  are  picked  up.  Formerly,  the  conductors  had  to 
prepare  these  statements  of  the  cars  composing  the  trains. 

Again,  the  trainman's  duties  on  passenger  trains  are  less  arduous 
because  passenger  trains  are  now  almost  universally  heated  with 
steam  or  hot  water  from  the  engine,  and  the  trainman  has  only  to 
regulate  the  degree  of  heat.  The  gradual  displacement  of  the  oil 
lamp  by  gas  and  electric  lighting  has  relieved  the  trainman  of  many 
former  duties. 

Increase  in  Trainloads. 

Coincident  with  the  development  of  safety  appliances  ou  trains, 
there  has  been  a  steady  and  rapid  increase  in  the  length  and  load, 
particularly  of  freight  trains.     Generally  speaking,  transportation  is 


lO 

conducted  most  economically  when  traffic  is  handled  in  the  largest 
units.  The  larger  the  loads  per  car  and  per  train,  the  less  the 
relative  investment  that  must  be  made  in  roadway,  track,  and  equip- 
ment, and  the  less  the  relative  expenditures  that  must  be  made  for 
maintenance  of  way  and  equipment,  and  for  conducting  transpor- 
tation. 

Faced  with  steadily  increasing  expenditures  for  wages,  materials, 
and  taxes,  while  their  revenues  from  the  transportation  of  freight 
and  passengers  do  not  increase  at  nearly  the  same  rate  as  expenses, 
the  railways  have  found  it  necessary  to  practice  economics  in  opera- 
tion. The  greatest  economies  have  been  secured  by  increasing  the 
number  of  tons  hauled  per  train,  and  by  increasing  the  amount  of 
traffic  handled  in  proportion  to  the  number  of  men  employed.  The 
extent  to  which,  in  their  efforts  to  handle  traffic  economically,  the 
railways  of  the  United  States  have  increased  their  trainloads  is 
indicated  by  the  fact  that  the  average  number  of  tons  per  train  in 
this  country  in  1890  was  175 ;  in  1900,  271,  and  in  1910,  380.  In  the 
region  of  heaviest  traffic,  that  comprising  in  general  the  States  of 
New  York,  Pennsylvania,  New  Jersey,  Delaware,  and  Maryland, 
the  average  number  of  tons  per  train  increased  from  218  in  1890  to 
502  in  1910.  On  some  lines  the  average  trainload  exceeds  1,100 
tons ;  trainloads  of  minerals  ranging  from  3,000  to  5,000  tons  are 
not  uncommon,  and  sometimes  a  train  has  as  many  as  6,000  tons. 
These  heavy  increases  in  trainloads  have  been  effected  very  largely 
by  increasing  the  capacity  of  cars  and  their  loading,  and  by  increas- 
ing the  number  of  cars  in  a  train.  The  average  capacity  of  a  freight 
car  in  this  country  increased  from  28  tons  in  1902  to  36  tons  in  1910. 
Loaded  freight  trains  often  contain  50  to  75  cars,  and  trains  con- 
taining even  larger  numbers  of  empty  cars  and  exceeding  a  half  mile 
in  length  are  run  not  infrequently  in  some  parts  of  the  country. 

There  has  been  no  such  corresponding  increase  in  the  length  of 
passenger  trains,  although  passenger  trains  on  main  lines  are  some- 
what longer  than  they  were  in  past  years.  Often  12  to  16  and  even 
more  cars  are  pulled  by  a  single  engine  ;  the  passenger  cars  have 
increased  in  size  and  especially  in  weight. 

With  this  increase  in  car  loading  and  train  loading  has  been  a 
decrease  in  the  number  of  men  required  to  handle  a  given  amount 
of  traffic.  It  has  not,  however,  been  accompanied  by  a  decrease  in 
the  total  number  of  trainmen,  for,  as  is  shown  later,  their  number 
has  increased  from  1901  to  1910  at  a  greater  rate  than  the  car 
mileage  or  the  train  mileage. 


TRAIN  CREWS   UNDP:r   PRESENT  CONDITIONS. 
Passenger  Service. 

The  number  of  men  employed  on  passenger  trains  varies  with 
conditions.  On  many  local  trains  containing  only  two  or  three 
ears  the  crew  behind  the  engine  consists  merely  of  the  conductor, 
acting  also  as  baggagemaster.  and  one  man  who  serves  as  brakeman 
or  flagman. 

In  the  South  many  two-car  trains  are  run  with  crews  behind  the 
engine  consisting  of  a  conductor,  brakeman,  and  negro  porter,  the 
conductor  or  the  brakeman  acting  as  baggagemaster.  Another  com- 
bination in  the  South  consists  of  a  conductor,  a  messenger  who 
takes  care  of  both  baggage  and  express,  and  a  porter.  In  this  case, 
the  baggagemaster  serves  as  flagman. 

Throughout  the  country  on  trains  of  four  or  five  cars,  the  crew 
customarily  includes  conductor,  baggagemaster,  brakeman  or  flag- 
man, and  frequently  a  porter ;  there  are  additional  brakemen  for 
trains  with  greater  numbers  of  cars.  The  brakemen  on  passenger 
trains  announce  stations,  help  the  passengers  as  they  get  on  and  off, 
set  switches,  load  and  unload  baggage,  look  out  for  hot  boxes  and 
other  defects,  and  flag.  When  there  are  both  a  porter  and  a  flag- 
man or  a  brakeman  and  a  flagman,  as  is  the  case  on  most  main-line 
passenger  trains,  the  flagman's  sole  duty  is  to  flag  and  to  set  switches 
behind  the  train. 

The  object  of  many  of  the  legislative  enactments  aflfecting  train 
crews  in  passenger  service  is  to  require  the  employment  on  every 
passenger  train,  whatever  its  length,  in  addition  to  the  men  on  the 
engine,  of  at  least  a  conductor,  a  baggagemaster,  and  a  brakeman  or 
flagman ;  and  to  require  still  other  men  on  trains  exceeding  certain 
specified  lengths.  For  example,  a  bill  introduced  in  Congress  in 
1909  provided  that  the  crew  of  a  passenger  train  having  three  cars 
or  less  must  include  a  conductor,  a  baggagemaster,  and  a  brakeman. 
This  would  have  made  it  necessary  to  add  a  baggagemaster  on  many 
short  branch-line  trains  carrying  at  present  only  a  conductor  and  a 
brakeman ;  and  in  many  cases  in  the  South  either  to  add  a  brakeman 
or  to  substitute  a  brakeman  for  the  porter.  The  same  bill  proviiled 
that  the  crew,  on  trains  of  three  cars  or  more,  include  at  least  a  con- 
ductor, a  baggagemaster.  and  two  brakemen.    This  would  have  made 

(TT) 


12. 

necessary  the  employment  of  an  additional  man  on  many  trains. 
The  law  in  Nevada  requires  two  brakemen  on  trains  of  three  or 
more  cars ;  the  laws  in  New  Jersey,  Oregon.  Pennsylvania,  Wash- 
ington, and  Wisconsin,  on  trains  of  four  or  more  cars;  the  law  in 
Indiana,  on  trains  of  five  or  more  cars,  and  the  law  in  Nebraska,  on 
trains  of  six  or  more  cars.  Under  the  New  Jersey  law  there  must 
be  at  least  six  trainmen  on  every  train  containing  a  baggage  car  in 
addition  to  four  or  more  passenger  cars,  and  under  the  New  York 
law  every  train  having  a  baggage  car  must  have  a  baggageman  in 
addition  to  the  engineer,  fireman,  conductor,  and  two  brakemen. 

These  laws  prescribe  the  number  of  trainmen  according  to  the 
number  of  cars  in  the  train.  Ikit  tiie  necessity  or  occasion  for  hav- 
ing more  rather  than  fewer  trainmen  is  not  necessarily  determined 
by  the  number  of  cars.  A  great  many  trains  carry  Pullman  cars, 
on  which  there  are  Pullman  conductors  and  porters  to  assist  passen- 
gers and  to  look  after  the  heating  and  lighting  and  ventilation  of 
their  respective  cars.  In  such  cases,  there  is  no  need  for  as  large 
a.  regular  train  crew  as  in  the  case  of  trains  of  the  same  length  carry- 
ing no  Pullmans.  And  yet  the  laws  make  no  allowance  for  the 
service  of  the  Pullman  porters.  Such  laws  appear  especially  illogical 
in  the  case  of  trains  composed  exclusively  of  I'ullman  cars. 

Freight  Service. 

INIodern  freight  trains  are  roughly  divided  into  two  classes — 
through  freight  trains  and  local  freight  trains.  The  broad  distinc- 
tion is  that  through  trains  ordinarily  run  from  terminal  to  terminal 
with  little  or  no  work  en  route  in  picking  up  or  setting  otit  cars 
or  in  delivering  or  receiving  freight  at  intermediate  points,  while 
local  trains  make  numerous  stops  at  intermediate  local  stations  to 
receive  and  deliver  freight,  switching  cars  at  such  stations  when 
necessary.  The  difference  in  the  service  not  only  expedites  the 
movement  of  traffic,  but  is  more  economical  from  an  operating  stand- 
point. 

On  a  through  freight  train  there  are  usually  five  men — an  engi- 
neer, fireman,  conductor,  and  two  brakemen — one  of  the  brakemen 
sometimes  being  called  a  "flagman."  At  the  point  of  origin  the 
train,  made  up  and  ready  for  its  run.  is  delivered  by  a  switching 
crew  to  the  train  crew.  The  place  of  one  of  the  brakemen  is  on  the 
engine,  the  other  goes  into  the  caboose  with  the  conductor.     The 


13 

ordinary  duties  of  the  forward  brakeman  are  to  transmit  signals 
from  the  conductor  to  the  engineer  and  to  open  switches  in  front 
when  it  is  necessary  for  the  train  to  go  on  a  siding  at  a  meeting 
point.  The  ordinary  duties  of  the  rear  brakeman  are  to  flag  at  the 
rear  end  of  the  train  when  it  stops  and  to  close  switches  behind  the 
train  when  it  has  gone  on  a  siding.  In  an  emergency  caused,  for 
example,  by  a  draw-bar  pulling  out  or  tl'.e  air-hose  parting,  the  con- 
ductor may  need  the  direct  assistance  of  one  of  the  brakemen.  In 
that  case  the  rules  require  the  rear  brakeman  to  flag  the  rear  of 
the  train  and  the  fireman  to  flag  the  front  of  the  train,  while  the 
forward  brakeman  assists  the  conductor.  In  these  very  rare  cases, 
the  fireman  may  be  used  to  protect  the  front  of  the  train,  because 
at  such  times  he  is  not  performing  any  other  duties.  As  already 
indicated,  there  is  ordinarily  a  valve  in  the  caboose  by  which,  in 
case  of  emergency,  the  brakes  can  be  set  by  any  one  who  is  in  the 
caboose;  or  if  anything  goes  wrong  with  the  apparatus,  the  brakes 
on  all  cars  are  at  once  set  automatically.  Failures  in  the  braking 
apparatus  that  cannot  be  promptly  remedied  on  the  spot  are  ordi- 
narily due  to  something  that  has  happened  in  or  to  the  engine.  In 
this  case  the  train  moves  slowly  and  under  control  to  the  next  sta- 
tion, where  it  is  held  until  another  engine  is  supplied. 

In  addition  to  the  air-brakes,  all  freight  cars  are  still  equipped 
with  hand-brakes.  These  hand-brakes  are  not  worked  by  employees 
on  through  freight  trains  in  the  o'"dinary  course.  They  are  resorted 
to  only  in  case  the  air-brakes  fail,  or  under  especial  conditions,  such 
as  going  down  steep  grades.  When  hand-brakes  are  used  on  such 
heavy  grades  as,  for  example,  on  some  parts  of  the  Xew  York  Cen- 
tral lines,  it  is  the  usual  custom  to  employ  three  or  more  brakemen 
on  through  freight  trains.  On  some  roads  under  similar  circum- 
stances a  mechanical  device  known  as  a  "retainer"  is  used  to  sup- 
plement the  air-brake,  but  even  then  where  the  grades  are  severe 
extra  brakemen  are  usually  employed.  As  a  general  rule,  the  duties 
of  brakemen  on  through  trains,  between  terminals  in  non-mountain- 
ous territory,  are  confined  to  throwing  switches,  flagging,  and  assist- 
ing the  conductor  in  examining  the  running  gear.  On  arrival  at  the 
terminal,  the  signal  lamps  are  put  away  and  the  caboose  locked  up 
by  the  train  crew,  and  the  train  is  turned  over  to  the  regular  yard 
switching  crew. 

While  it  is  the  general  custom  to  employ  two  iMMkemcn  on  a 
through  freight  train,  it  is  usual  to  employ  three  or  more  brakemen 


14 

on  a  local  freight  train,  notwithstanding  that  local  trains  have  fewer 
cars.  This  is  not  to  serve  the  need  for  safety,  but  to  expedite  the 
service.  Local  trains  set  out  and  pick  up  cars  at  way  stations,  and 
load  and  unload  a  great  deal  of  less-than-carload  freight.  Hence 
there  is  much  switching  to  be  done  and  much  handling  of  freight  at 
way  stations,  and  the  additional  brakemen  are  ordinarily  necessary 
that  the  trains  may  not  be  unduly  detained.  Similarly,  three  brake- 
men  are  usually  employed  on  a  train  switching  cars  to  and  from 
industrial  tracks.  It  is  only  in  these  cases  when  cars  are  being 
switched  that  brakemen  are  obliged  to  go  on  the  top  of  cars  to 
operate  hand-brakes.  When  a  train  is  under  way  the  third  brake- 
man  has  no  particular  duties  or  station,  but  frequently  rides  in  the 
caboose  with  the  Conductor  and  rear  brakeman. 

So  far  as  freight-train  service  is  concerned,  the  purpose  of  train- 
crew  legislation  usually  is  to  require  the  railways  to  employ  at  least 
three  brakemen  on  a  through  freight  train.  As  has  been  said,  it  is 
standard  practice  to  employ  at  least  two  brakemen  on  every  through 
train  and  at  least  three  brakemen  on  every  local  train.  Following 
is  a  list  of  the  States  in  which  laws  have  been  passed  requiring 
three  brakemen  on  trains  and  specifying  the  minimum  number  of 
cars  to  which  this  requirement  shall  apply:  Arkansas  and  Wash- 
ington, 25  cars  or  more  ;  New  York,  26  cars  or  more ;  Maryland^ 
New  Jersey,  and  Pennsylvania,  30  cars  or  more;  Arizona,  Missouri, 
and  Oregon,  40  cars  or  more ;  California,  Nevada,  and  Indiana,  50 
ears  or  more ;  North  Dakota,  46  or  more  cars.  The  bills  that  have 
been  introduced  in  Congress  usually  have  required  three  brakemen 
on  every  train  containing  25  cars  or  more. 

Here,  again,  it  will  be  seen  that  the  laws  prescribe  the  number  of 
trainmen  on  the  basis  of  the  number  of  cars  in  the  train.  From 
what  has  just  been  said  of  the  character  of  the  work  to  be  done  on 
through  and  local  trains,  it  is  evident  that  the  number  of  cars  in  a 
train  is  not  the  logical  basis  for  the  determination  of  the  size  of  the 
train  crew. 


EFFECTS  OF  TRAIx\-CRE\\"   LEGISLATION. 

Increase  in  Operating  Expenses. 

It  is  obvious  that  an  increase  in  the  number  of  men  in  a  train  crew 
means  an  increase  in  the  operating  expenses  and,  unless  accom- 
panied by  a  corresponding  increase  in  the  trafific  per  train  or  in 
rates,  means  a  decrease  in  net  operating  revenues.  The  railways 
are  reporting  to  the  Special  Committee  on  the  Relation  of  Railway 
Operation  to  Legislation  careful  estimates  of  the  additional  expense 
resulting  from  state  legislation  already  enacted.  At  the  time  this 
bulletin  goes  to  press,  that  committee  had  not  received  estimates 
from  some  of  the  largest  lines.  However,  the  estimates  that  have 
been  reported  up  to  this  time  are  given  in  the  following  table  as  a 
partial  indication : 

Estimates  of  Additional  Annual  Expense  to  the  Railways  in  Certain 
States,  so  far  as  Reported  to  October  i,  1913,  Resulting  from  Train- 
crew  Laws  Enacted  by  those  States. 

Arkansas $179,085 

California  66,297 

Indiana  244,052 

Maine 602 

Maryland    96,921 

Missouri  (a  general  estimate) 500,000 

Nebraska    24,367 

New  Jersey 381,851 

New  York 854,016 

Ohio   139,592 

Oregon  (O.,  R.  &  N.  Co.  alone) 47,000 

Pennsylvania 1,211,233 

Washington   158,026 

Total  reported  to  date $3,903,042 

Considering  the  number  of  railways  not  represcnlcd  in  these  esti- 
mates, and  the  importance  of  some  of  them,  it  is  not  improbable 
that  the  additional  annual  expense  to  the  railroads  in  the  above- 
named  states  on  account  of  the  train-crew  laws  enacted  by  these 
states  will  amount  to  $6,000,000. 

These  estimates  apply  to  the  expense  to  the  railroads  on  account 
of  train-crew  laws  enacted  in  only  a  limited  number  of  states.  But 
the  full  effect  can  be  seen  only  from  estimates  that  apjily  on  account 
of  all  such  laws  to  all  the  railways  in  the  United  States.    Four  train- 

(15) 


i6 

crew  bills  were  introduced  in  Congress  in  1909  and  1910.  The 
Special  Committee  on  the  Relation  of  Railway  Operation  to  Legis- 
lation made  inquiries  early  in  1910  of  all  the  railways  as  to  the  cost 
to  them  of  complying  with  these  federal  bills,  if  enacted,  as  well  as 
the  expense  they  were  being  put  to  on  account  of  state  legislation 
then  in  force  in  13  states.  The  following  table  is  a  summary  of  the 
replies  received : 


EsTiMATK  OK  1910.  Number.         .Mi 


Amount  of  addi- 
tional annual   cost 

of  complianpe 
with  full-crew  bill. 

Roads  replying t66  205,547  $18,328,302.32 

Estimated  for  other  roads  exclusive  of 

Canadian  and  Mexican  roads 126  23,254  1,953.336-00 


Total 292  228,801  $20,281,638.32 

Another  bill  was  introduced  in  Congress  in  191 2  which  required 
that  on  each  freight  train  containing  25  or  more  cars  the  crew  shall 
consist  of  at  least  an  engineer,  a  fireman,  a  condtictor,  and  three 
brakemen,  "regardless  of  any  modern  equipment  of  automatic 
couplers  and  air-brakes.''  This  bill  made  no  reference  to  passenger- 
train  crews.  As  a  result  of  incjuiries  made  of  the  railways  by  the 
Special  Committee  on  Relations  of  Railway  Operation  to  Legis- 
lation, in  connection  with  this  proposed  Federal  law,  the  following 
compilation  was  made  from  the  replies  received  from  143  operating 
companies : 

Estimates  01*  Cost,  in  1912,  of  Tr.\in-cre\v  Laws  Furnished  by   143 
Operating  Companies  Operating  195,049  Miles. 

Trains  affected  by  state  laws  then  in  effect,  per  annum 678,661  ^ 

Additional  trains  affected  by  proposed   federal  law   in   states    then 

having  full-crew  law.  per  annum 458.483 

Trains  affected  by  proposed  law  in  states  then  having  no  full-crew 

law,  per  annum 3.211,056 


Total    trains   affected    by    state    laws    and    proposed    Federal 

statute,  per  annum 4,358,200 

Cost  of  compliance  with  state  laws  then  in  effect,  per  annum..   $1,797,589.94^ 
Additional  cost  of  compliance  with  proposed  law  in  states  then 

having  full-crew  law.  per  annum 1,342,237. 17 

Cost  of  compliance  with  proposed  law  in  states  then  having  no 

full-crew  law,  per  annum 10,255,790.66 


Total   cost   per  annum   of  compliance   with   state   laws 

and  proposed  statute .■ $13,395,617.77 


''Does  not  include  states  where  laws  were  passed  subsequent  to  1911. 


17 

This  tabulation  shows  that,  according  to  the  estimates  of  these 
143  railways  operating  approximately  85  per  cent  of  the  steam  rail- 
way mileage  of  the  country,  the  additional  cost  to  them  of  comply- 
ing with  the  proposed  federal  bill  in  States  where  train-crew  legis- 
lation is  alread}^  in  operation  would  amount  to  $1,342,237.17  per 
annum,  or  approximately  75  per  cent  of  the  cost  of  compliance  with 
state  laws  already  in  effect.  The  estimated  cost  to  them  of  com- 
pliance with  the  proposed  federal  act  in  States  where  there  was  no 
train-crew  legislation  was  estimated  to  be  $10,255,790  per  annum  ; 
the  estimated  cost  to  them  of  compliance  with  state  laws  then  in 
effect  was  $1,797,589.94;  making  the  total  estimated  expense  of  these 
143  companies  for  federal  and  state  legislation  to  be  $13,395,617. 

It  should  not  be  overlooked  that  this  expense  is  only  a  part  of  the 
total  increase  in  operating  expenses  that  has  been  caused  by  legis- 
lative requirements  imposed  upon  railroad  operation.  Such  legisla- 
tion includes  laws  requiring  8-wheel  cabooses  in  place  of  4-wheel 
cabooses,  laws  limiting  the  hours  of  service,  requiring  electric  head- 
lights, requiring  the  installation  of  improved  safety  appliances,  regu- 
lating the  stops  of  passenger  trains,  the  speed  of  stock  and  freight 
trains,  requiring  the  abolition  of  grade  crossings,  or  the  installation 
of  additional  watchmen  at  crossings,  requiring  double  track,  and 
providing  for  days  off  at  the  company's  expense.  Quite  indepen- 
dent of  the  question  of  the  defensibility  of  these  laws  is  the  fact  that 
they  add  greatly  to  the  expense  of  railway  operation,  which  must 
eventually  find  expression  in  higher  charges  to  the  public  than 
would  otherwise  be  made. 

Howe^■el■.  the  fact  tliat  such  train-crew  legislation  increases  oper- 
ating expenses  is  not  a  conclusive  argument  against  it.  The  legisla- 
tion, presumably,  is  intended  to  promote  the  interest  of  the  public, 
and  the  question  at  issue  is  whether  there  are  benefits  directlv  or  in- 
directly conferred  on  the  pul)lic.  and.  if  so.  are  they  commensurate 
W'ith  the  expense  incurred. 


ISSUES  INVOLVED  IN  TRAIN-CREW  LEGISLATION. 

[n  order  that  the  arguments  in  fa\'or  of  train-crew  legislation  may 
De  fairly  presented,  it  is  desirable  to  give  the  fullest  consideration 
to  any  statement  from  an  authoritative  source.  To  this  end  a  thor- 
ough search  has  been  made  throughout  the  existing  body  of  railway 
literature,  throughout  the  reports  of  hearings  before  the  Committees 
of  Congress,  and  recent  issues  of  The  Railroad  Trainman,  the  official 
organ  of  the  Brotherhood  of  Railroad  Trainmen.  An  effort  was 
made  to  secure  reports  of  hearings  before  State  legislatures  also, 
but  without  success,  except  in  the  case  of  Kansas.  On  account  of 
the  paucity  of  available  data,  of  precise  and  specific  character,  sup- 
porting the  trainmen's  side  of  the  case,  a  copy  of  the  first  page  proof 
of  this  study  was  sent  to  each  of  the  presidents  of  the  four  railway 
brotherhoods,  with  a  letter  inviting  their  criticisms  and  suggestions 
and  expressing  an  especial  desire  to  receive  further  concrete -and 
definite  information.  But  this  effort  has  not  elicited  any  further 
data.^  The  only  arguments  containing  definite  statements  why  extra 
crew  legislation  should  be  enacted  that  have  been  found  are  em- 
bodied in  a  statement  by  W.  G.  Lee,  President  of  the  Brotherhood 
of  Railway  Trainmen,  quoted  in  the  Metropolitan  Magazine-  for 
June,  1913,  and  in  a  statement  madeby  A.  A.  Roe,  representing  the 
Brotherhood  of  Railway  Trainmen  at  a  hearing  held  in  191 1  by  a 
committee  of  the  Kansas  legislature. 

Mr.  Lee's  statement  is  as  follows : 

"The  necessity  for  such  legislation  arose  out  of  the  practice  of 
the  railway  companies  reducing  the  number  of  men  to  an  extent 
considered  unsafe  by  the  employees.  Some  years  ago  certain  rail- 
ways reduced  the  number  of  freight  trainmen  to  one.  whose  dut}- 
was  to  flag,  leaving  the  work  of  running  and  looking  after  the  train 
to  the  conductor. 

"Further  necessity  (for  such  legislation)  arose  through  increased 
tonnage  and  fewer  men  employed,  which  was  made  possible  by 
safety  appliances  and  heavier  equipment.  The  railways  assumed 
the  position  that  as  trainmen  no  longer  had  to  control  trains  by 
hand-brakes  they  were  unnecessary.  The  heavier  demands  for  in- 
creased tonnage  placed  on  trainmen  in  other  ways  were  not  con- 
sidered.    On  the  majority  of  our  railways  freight  trains  are  com- 


'  See  addendum,  page  37. 

(18) 


posed  of  50  to  100  cars;  they  are  from  half  a  mile  to  a  mile  in 
length.  Such  trains  must  be  carefully  inspected  at  water  tanks  and 
other  stops.  They  require  extra  care  in  handling,  particularly  in 
crossing  over  to  permit  superior  class  trains  to  pass.  If  switching 
is  to  be  done,  and  less  than  three  men  are  employed,  it  leaves  this 
work  to  be  done  by  one  man  under  conditions  most  dangerous  to 
himself  and  the  traveling  public,  particularly  when  the  work  is  done 
at  night. 

"Railway  companies  have  forced  men  to  work  under  unsafe  con- 
ditions, with  the  result  that  hundreds  are  disabled  or  killed  every 
year.  Our  Brotherhood  paid  one  claim  for  every  sixty-seven  mem- 
bers in  the  year  1912,  which  is  evidence  that  train  service  is  most 
hazardous. 

"Statement  is  made  that  extra  men  have  not  prevented  wrecks. 
No  one  can  speak  advisably  on  this  subject.  Wrecks  that  are  pre- 
vented do  not  figure  in  the  statistics. 

"Railway  managers  rest  their  case  on  the  statement  that  full-crew 
legislation  will  not  prevent  wrecks.  Employees,  speaking  from  daily 
experience,  contend  that  it  will  make  wrecks  less  frequent  than  they 
otherwise  would  be,  and  that  it  will  increase  the  personal  safety  of 
employees  and  the  public.  Managers  argue  that  such  legislation 
would  put  an  unnecessary  cost  on  the  public.  Employees  point  to 
the  fact  that  every  six  minutes,  day  and  night,  year  after  year,  one 
of  their  number  is  killed  or  injured.  In  the  name  of  humanity  they 
ask  from  the  State  the  protection  denied  them  by  the  company." 

This  statement  by  the  official  head  of  the  trainmen's  organization 
appears  to  contain  tw^o  definite  points:  i.  The  adoption  of  safety 
appliances  and  the  increase  in  trainload  has  resulted  in  a  reduction 
of  the  number  of  trainmen  relative  to  the  work  to  be  done.  2.  This 
reduction  in  the  number  of  trainmen  has  increased  the  risk  both  to 
the  trainmen  and  to  the  public  and  consequently  the  number  of 
casualties  in  train  service. 

In  his  argument  before  the  committee  of  the  Kansas  legislature, 
Mr.  Roe  specifically  disclaimed  that  the  efforts  to  obtain  train-crew 
legislation  were  prompted  by  any  desire  to  secure  a  reduction  in  the 
work  performed  by  any  trainman,  or  that  if  enacted  it  would  result 
in  any  such  reduction  in  their  work.  He  based  his  argument  en- 
tirely upon  the  ground  of  safety,  stating  that  there  are  occasions 
when  an  additional  man  is  needed  to  ensure  the  accurate  and  prompt 
transmission  of  signals  Ijetween  the  conductor  and  the  engineer,  and 
that  there  are  occasions  when  the  protection  of  the  rear  of  the  train 
requires  an  additional  man. 


20 

In  the  argument  that  an  additional  man  is  sometimes  needed  to 
transmit  signals  he  instanced  cases  where  in  the  absence  of  such  a 
man  there  might  be  an  accident,  but  did  not  cite  any  specific  acci- 
dent as  having  been  due  to  this  cause.  His  examples  to  show  the 
need  of  another  man  to  protect  the  rear  of  the  train  were  no  more 
concrete,  and  he  admitted  that  there  was  no  work  for  an  additional 
man  to  do  when  the  train  was  running  between  stations. 

Xninbcr  of  Trainmen  for  U'ork  Performed. 

Available  statistics  on  the  question  of  fact  in  the  first  point  made 
by  ]\Ir.  Lee  may  now  be  noted.  It  is  difficult  to  present  any  official 
statistics  that  will  determine  with  absolute  accuracy  the  relation  of 
the  number  of  trainmen  to  the  work  performed.  It  has  already 
been  noted  that  it  is  at  present  an  almost  universal  practice  to  em- 
ploy at  least  a  conductor  and  two  trainmen  on  through  freight  trains. 
It  has  also  been  indicated  that  it  is  the  general  custom  to  employ  at 
least  three  brakemen  on  local  freight  trains,  which  are  almost  the 
only  trains  whose  crews  do  switching  en  route.  Even  in  this  serv- 
ice, according  to  the  contention  of  the  railways,  a  third  hrakeman  is 
emploved  to  expedite  business,  and  not  because  he  is  needed  in  the 
interest  of  safety.  The  fireman  can,  when  necessary  in  emergency, 
flag  the  front  of  the  train  and  the  flagman  the  rear,  leaving  the  con- 
ductor and  forward  brakeman  to  perform  the  switching. 

In  the  case  of  through  trains  it  is  difficult  for  the  railways  to 
discover  anv  dtities  for  a  third  brakeman  that  could  not  be  per- 
formed easilv  by  other  members  of  the  crew.  One  duty  frequently 
suggested,  but  not  mentioned  by  Mr.  Lee  in  his  statement  in  the 
Metropolitan  Maga:::ine,  is  that  a  third  brakeman  is  needed  to  ride 
on  the  top  of  the  train.  Except  on  mountain  grades,  where  a  third 
brakeman  is  provided,  he  is  not  needed  on  top  of  the  train  to  manip- 
ulate the  hand-brakes ;  and  even  although  he  might  possibly  at 
times  be  useful  in  that  position  to  transnnt  signals  to  the  engineer, 
it  is  the  experience  of  operating  officers  that  no  discipline  has  yet 
been  devised  sufficiently  severe  to  keep  him  there.  It  is  an  uncom- 
fortable and  dangerous  position,  and  the  brakeman  naturally  prefers 
the  comfort  and  companionship  of  the  caboose. 

In  this  connection  Mr.  Lee  voices  the  complaint  that  the  longer 
trains  and  heavier  equipment  have  increased  the  responsibility  of 
trainmen  in  the  inspection  of  the  trains  when  stops  are  made  at 


21 

coaling  and  water  stations.  It  has  already  been  noted  that  the 
train  crews  no  longer  make  the  careful  and  detailed  inspection  of 
cars  at  the  terminals  before  setting  out  upon  their  run.  This  work 
is  now  done  by  special  employees  at  the  terminals.  But  each  train 
crew  is  required  to  keep  a  lookout  en  route  for  such  faulty  con- 
ditions as  hot  boxes,  broken  couplers,  broken  brake-gear,  and  the 
like.  The  rules  governing  such  observation  of  the  train  differ 
on  different  roads.  But.  in  a  general  way,  the  requirement  is  that 
whenever  trains  stop  at  coaling  and  water  stations  the  trainmen 
shall  examine  the  train  for  the  purpose  of  detecting  any  such  de- 
fects. Sometimes,  when  the  conditions  are  favorable,  or  when  the 
occasion  requires  a  more  careful  observation,  the  forward  brake- 
man  walks  down  one  side  of  the  train  while  the  conductor  or  a  rear 
brakeman  walks  up  the  other  side  until  they  are  directly  opposite  to 
each  other.  They  then  cross  over,  and  the  rear  brakeman  inspects 
the  other  side  to  the  rear  of  the  train  in  going  back  to  the  caboose, 
while  the  forward  brakeman  looks  over  the  other  side  to  the  front 
of  the  train  in  going  back  to  the  engine.  But  the  ordinary  condi- 
tions of  train  operation  do  not  require  such  an  examination.  It  is 
not  necessary,  except  after  a  train  has  undergone  some  special 
strain,  as  when  passing  over  a  heavy  grade,  or  making  an  uncom- 
monly fast  run.  or  when  it  is  about  to  be  placed  under  some  such 
unusual  stress.  The  customary  practice  is  for  the  forward  brake- 
man  to  watch  the  train  as  it  pulls  by,  then  to  climb  on  the  caboose 
and  walk  over  the  train  to  the  engine,  continuing  the  examination 
as  he  goes. 

It  is  conceivable  that  additional  men  in  the  crew  could  reduce  the 
time  and  labor  required  for  the  more  careful  examination  first  de- 
scribed, or  could  permit  it  to  be  made  in  a  greater  number  of  cases. 
But  opportunities  for  such  observation  in  the  case  of  through  trains 
are  few  because  the  stops  are  infrequent,  and  the  number  of  men 
always  on  local  trains  is  sufficient  to  make  any  needed  examination. 
Therefore,  the  practical  effect  of  a  larger  crew  upon  the  number  or 
the  carefulness  of  these  so-called  "inspections"  of  trains  on  the  road 
would  be  very  small. 

The  following  table,  drawn  from  the  annual  statistical  compila- 
tions of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission,  is  presented  for  tlie 
purpose  of  showing  as  accurately  as  possible  the  relation  of  the 
increase  in  the  number  of  trainmen  to  the  increase  in  work  per- 
formed l)ctween  the  years   iqoi    and    1910.     The  term   ''trainmen" 


22 

as  liere  used  includes  enginemen,  firemen,  conductors,  and  all  other 
men  employed  on  trains  for  the  purpose  of  their  operation  ;  the 
term  "other  trainmen"  as  here  used  includes  all  trainmen  except  en- 
ginemen, firemen,  and  conductors.  It  is  impracticable  to  separate 
men  employed  in  passenger  service  from  those  employed  in  freight 
service ;  hence  the  train  mileage  shown  is  total  train  mileage,  both 
passenger  and  freight,  in  revenue  service.  It  is  impossible  to  secure 
passenger-car  mileage  from  the  reports  to  the  commission  for  1901, 
and  therefore  it  has  been  necessary  to  use  the  freight-car  mileage 
alone.  In  view  of  the  fact  that  the  statistics  are  presented  merely 
to  show  a  tendency,  the  conclusions  drawn  are  not  disturbed  by  the 
slight  degree  of  non-comparability. 


uim. 

I'JIO. 

Increase. 

Per  oeiit  of 
iiiciease. 

Total   train-miles, 

revenue  service. 

908,092,818 

1,221,852,647 

313,759,829 

34-55 

Freight  car-miles, 

revenue  service. 

12,832,092,209 

18,981,573,779 

6,149,481,570 

47.9^ 

Total      number 

trainmen 

209,043 

318,632 

109,589 

52.42 

■"Other  trainmen" 

84,493 

T  36,938 

52,445 

62.07 

These  statistics  show  that  while  train-miles  have  increased  over 
34  per  cent  between  1901  and  1910,  and  freight-car  miles  about  48 
per  cent,  the  number  of  trainmen  employed  has  increased  over  52 
per  cent,  and  of  "other  trainmen,"  largely  brakemen  and  flagmen,  62 
-per  cent.  It  has  already  been  noted  that  the  number  of  trainmen 
in  proportion  to  the  tonnage  handled  has  decreased.  But,  since  the 
trainmen's  work  is  with  cars  and  trains,  rather  than  with  tons  car- 
ried, car-miles  and  train-miles  are  a  much  better  index  of  the  amount 
of  their  work.  On  that  basis,  while  the  data  given  do  not  abso- 
lutely prove  that  the  number  of  trainmen  has  increased  more  rap- 
idly than  the  work  to  be  performed  by  them,  it  would  seem  to  be  a 
fair  conclusion  that  Mr.  Lee's  contention  that  railways  have  reduced 
the  number  of  their  trainmen  relative  to  the  work  to  be  done  is  not 
sustained. 


TRAIX-CREWS  AND  ACCIDENTS. 

Accidents  to  Trainmen  During  the  Year  ipi2. 

In  order  to  reach  a  conclusion  as  to  whether  accidents  to  trainmen 
have  increased  in  recent  years  as  a  result  of  more  economical 
methods  of  operation,  it  is  desirable  in  the  first  place  to  analyze,  so 
far  as  the  statistics  will  permit,  the  causes  of  accidents  to  trainmen. 
In  the  first  place,  Mr.  Lee's  statement  that  the  Brotherhood  of 
Trainmen  paid  one  claim  for  each  67  members  in  1912  is  apt  to  be 
misleading.  It  implies  that  this  proportion  of  claims  was  due  to 
accidental  causes;  but  a  hasty  check  shows  that  of  the  claims  paid 
in  1912  no  less  than  48  per  cent  were  ascribed  to  natural  causes  and 
only  52  per  cent  to  accidental  causes.  Based  on  the  average  mem- 
bership for  the  year,  the  claims  paid  that  were  due  to  accidental 
causes  thus  numbered  only  one  for  each  119  members. 

In  Connection  zmth  Train  Operation. 

Turning  to  the  official  statistics  of  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission,  the  following  table,  compiled  by  the  accident  division, 
shows  the  casualties  to  trainmen  classified  according  to  the  causes, 
as  reported  by  the  railways  in  their  monthly  returns  to  the  commis- 
sion. These  statistics  are  for  the  fiscal  year  ending  June  30,  1912. 
They  are  divided  into  two  parts — those  relating  to  casualties  in 
connection  with  train  operation,  but  not  resulting  from  accidents 
to  trains,  and  the  other  covering  casualties  directly  due  to  train 
accidents. 


(23) 


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It  will  be  seen  that  a  large  proportion  of  the  accidents  to  trainmen 
were  due  to  their  being  struck  or  run  over  by  engine  or  car,  falling 
from  cars  or  engines,  coming  in  contact  with  overhead  or  lateral 
obstructions,  or  that  they  occurred  while  getting  on  or  ofif  cars  or 
engines.  Of  the  total  casualties  in  1912,  50.4  per  cent  of  those  that 
were  fatal  and  34.1  per  cent  of  those  entailing  injury  were  so  caused. 

While  it  may  be  conceivable  that  an  indirect  connection  might  be 
shown  between  some  of  these  accidents  and  a  supposedly  insufficient 
number  of  employees  on  the  train,  such  a  connection  seems  remote 
and  cannot  be  established  by  any  existing  information.  It  does  not 
seem  clear  that  an  increase  in  the  number  of  employees  W'Ould  tend 
to  reduce  such  accidents  as  these.  Rather  might  it  be  assumed  that 
an  increase  in  the  number  of  trainmen  would  tenil  to  increase  the 
number  of  such  accidents.  For  example,  if  a  third  brakeman  on 
freight  trains  were  required  to  ride  on  the  top  of  the  train,  it  is 
fair  to  assume  that  there  would  be  an  increase  in  the  number  of 
trakemen  killed  and  injured  by  falling  from  cars  or  coming  in  con- 
tact with  lateral  or  overhead  obstructions.  An  increase  in  the  num- 
ber of  trainmen  would  not,  of  course,  reduce  the  casualties  resulting 
from  fires,  floods,  landslides,  or  explosions. 

This  conclusion  seems  to  be  well  supported :  An  analysis  of  the 
causes  of  accidents  to  trainmen  indicates  little  or  no  possibilitv  that 
larger  crews  would  reduce  the  risk  of  accident  to  trainmen. 

/;/  Connection  with  Train  Accidents. 

Turning  to  train  accidents  proper,  the  important  causes  are  col- 
lisions and  derailments.  The  Interstate  Commerce  Commission 
makes  the  following  classification  of  the  causes  of  derailments  oc- 
curring in  1912 : 

Nnmbei'. 

Derailments  due  to  defects  in  roadwa}-,  etc 1,877 

T)erailments  due  to  defects  of  equipment 3.847 

Derailments  due  to  negligence  of  trainmen,  signal  men.  etc 423 

Derailments  due  to  unforeseen  obstructions  of  track,  etc 412 

Derailments  due  to  malicious  obstruction  of  track 75 

Derailments  due  to  miscellaneous  causes 1,581 

Total 8.215 

Out  of  the  8.215  derailments  reported,  only  423.  the  number  at- 
tributed to  "negligence  of  trainmen,  signal  men.  etc.."  can  be  spe- 
•cificallv   connected   with   tlie   train   crews.     The   language   used   bv 


a6 

the  commission  does  not  imjjly  that  any  of  these  deraihnents  could 
be  attributed  to  too  few  men  in  train  crews.  It  rather  implies  that 
they  were  due  to  the  "negligence"  of  those  who  were  so  employed. 
It  is  of  course  conceivable  that  defects  in  equipment  might  have 
been  noted  and  derailments  avoided  had  the  crew  been  larger :  but 
this  is  an  assumption  which  cannot  be  sustained  by  any  evidence 
that  has  been  found. 

As  to  collisions,  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  said  in  its 
annual  report  for  1912: 

"The  most  disquieting  and  perplexing  feature  of  the  problem 
of  accident  prevention  is  the  large  proportion  of  train  accidents 
caused  by  dereliction  of  duty  by  the  employees  involved.  By  far 
the  greatest  number  of  our  serious  train  accidents  are  due  to  the 
failure  of  some  responsible  employee  to  perform  an  essential  duty 
at  a  critical  time.  The  seriousness  of  this  problem  is  indicated  by 
the  fact  that  of  the  81  accidents  investigated  up  to  September  i,  52^ 
or  more  than  63  per  cent  of  the  whole  number  investigated,  were 
caused  by  mistakes  on  the  part  of  employees.  These  52  accidents 
comprise  48  of  the  49  collisions  investigated  and  4  of  the  41  derail- 
ments. They  caused  the  death  of  248  persons  and  the  injury  of 
1,309  persons.  Of  the  48  collisions  caused  by  the  errors  of  em- 
ployees, 33  occurred  on  roads  operated  under  the  train-order  system 
and  15  occurred  under  the  block  system.  The  most  numerous 
failures  were  by  trainmen  or  enginemen.  These  were  disobedience 
of  orders,  disobedience  of  signals,  failure  to  keep  clear  of  superior 
trains,  improper  flagging,,  and  failure  to  control  speed  at  danger- 
ous points,  v^uch  lapses  were  responsible  for  41  of  the  accidents 
investigated." 

There  is  no  indication  in  this  statement  that  the  commission 
believed  that  the  collisions  or  other  accidents  investigated  were  due 
to  an  insufificient  number  of  train  employees,  yet  in  all  fairness  it 
must  be  noted  that  the  statement  of  causes  is  not  sufficiently  com- 
plete or  thorough  to  permit  the  positive  statement  that  none  of  these 
accidents  would  have  been  avoided  had  the  train  crews  been  larger. 

Accidents  to  Trainmen  from  igor  to  igi2. 

In  connection  with  Mr.  Lee's  assertion  that  casualties  to  trainmen 
are  in  part  due  to  the  insufficient  size  of  the  train  crew,  and  his  im- 
plication that  casualties  are  increasing,  it  is  of  interest  to  examine 
the  statistics  of  casualties  to  trainmen  from  1901  to  1912,  classified 
bv  their  causes,  here  shown  in  Table  II.     These  statistics  compiled 


27 

by  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  are  not  wholly  comparable, 
as  certain  changes  have  been  made  in  the  classification  of  accidents 
during  the  period.  Moreover,  the  statistics  from  1901  to  1910  are 
taken  from  the  annual  reports  of  the  railways  to  the  commission, 
while  those  for  191 1  and  1912  are  from  the  annual  summary  of  the 
monthly  reports  of  accidents,  annual  reports  of  accidents  having 
been  abandoned  in  1910.  Because  of  the  fact  that  for  the  last  two 
years  here  presented  the  reports  are  made  by  the  railways  to  the 
commission  monthly  instead  of  annually,  and  because  the  inspec- 
tion of  accidents  has  been  more  rigorous,  the  statistics  for  these  last 
two  years  have  doubtless  been  more  complete ;  this  will  probably 
account,  in  considerable  part,  for  the  striking  increases  in  the  num- 
ber injured.  The  fact  that  the  larger  number  of  casualties  to  train- 
men are  due  to  causes  which  have  little,  if  any,  relation  to  the  num- 
ber of  men  employed  has  already  been  discussed.  This  table  simply 
emphasizes  the  fact  by  showing  the  same  situation  for  12  successive 
years.  It  should  be  noted,  further,  that  while  the  number  of  in- 
juries considerably  increased  from  1901  to  1904,  they  then  did  not 
vary  greatly  year  by  year  until  191 1,  when  they  again  appear  to 
increase  (due  in  part,  as  already  noted,  to  more  complete  reports). 
The  number  of  deaths,  taking  the  period  as  a  whole,  was  about  the 
same  for  each  year. 


28 


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29 

During  the  ten  years,  1902-1912,  the  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission investigated  directly  through  its  own  agents  1,431  train 
accidents,  which  were  responsible  for  the  death  of  3,447  persons,, 
or  about  one-third  of  the  total  number  killed  in  such  accidents  dur- 
ing this  period,  and  the  injury  of  18,908  persons,  or  about  one- 
eighth  of  the  total  number  injured  in  such  accidents  during  this 
pe'riod. 

The  following  tabulation  shows  the  causes  to  which  the  commis- 
sion attributed  these  1,431  train  accidents: 

Causes  of  Principai,  Train  Accidents   on  Railways  of  United  States, 
Fiscal  Years  1902  to  1912,  Inclusive. 

Fault  of  train  crew  other  than  brakemen :  Number. 

Disobedience  of  rules  or  orders 63 

Misread    orders 69 

Ran  past  signal 66 

Ran  past  meeting  point 36 

Carelessness 95 

Forgetfulness    49 

Asleep  40 

Intoxication  5 

Failure  to  follow  schedule 16 

Excessive  speed 137 

Other  errors 1 

Total 577 

Fault  of  brakemen : 

Failure  to  set  brakes 40 

Failure  to  flag 72 

Improper  flagging 26 

Other  errors 5 

Total 143 

Fault  of  dispatchers,  operators,  etc. : 

Wrong  orders 89 

Failure  to  deliver  orders 67 

Signal   incorrectly  set 60 

Switch    misplaced 59 

Other  errors 2 

Total ; 277 

Fault  of  other  employees 18 

Mechanical  defects: 

Defective  or  weakened  track 59 

Defective  or  weakened  equipment 96 

Failure  of  air-brakes 30 

Failure  of  block  signals 4 

Total 189 

Parting  of  trains II 

Hostile  weather  conditions 68 

Malicious  interference  with  track  or  equipment 41 

Miscellaneous  causes 35 

Causes  uncertain  or  unknown 72 

Total 1,431 


30 

Again,  it  may  be  said  that,  while  the  commission  attributes  none 
of  these  accidents  to  an  insufficient  number  of  men,  yet  it  is  clear 
that  the  commission  does  not  follow  the  causes  to  their  ultimate 
source,  and  hence  it  cannot  be  claimed  that  these  statistics  alone 
demonstrate  that  none  of  these  accidents  were  due  to  an  insufficient 
train  force. 

Accidents  to  Long  Freight  Trains. 

The  argument  that  more  than  two  brakemen  should  be  employed 
on  long  through  trains  in  the  interest  of  safety  implies  that  these 
trains  are  more  liable  to  accidents  than  short  local  trains  with  three 
brakemen,  and  that  the  third  brakeman  should  be  employed  on 
through  trains  to  reduce  this  liability.  In  this  connection  may  be 
quoted  statistics  compiled  by  C.  W.  Kouns,  general  manager  of 
the  Atchison,  Topeka  &  Santa  Fe  Railway's  eastern  lines,  presented 
to  the  Joint  Railroad  Committee  of  the  House  and  Senate  of  the 
Kansas  Legislature  last  winter.     Mr.  Kouns  said: 

"For  the  purpose  of  aiding  an  understanding,  these  reports  have 
been  divided  to  show  the  number  of  accidents  occurring  to  trains 
having  more  or  less  than  25  cars. 

"The  Missouri,  Kansas  &  Texas  report,  covering  three  divisions, 
shows  2,718  trains  run.  Of  this  number,  there  were  79  accidents  to 
trains  carrying  more  than  25  cars  and  119  to  trains  carrying  less 
than  25  cars.  In  other  words,  under  the  first  item  there  was  one 
accident  to  every  345  trains,  while  the  second  shows  one  accident  to 
every  179  trains. 

"On  the  Union  Pacific,  in  Kansas,  during  January,  1913,  there 
were  five  accidents ;  all  to  trains  having  less  than  25  cars.  There 
were  873  such  trains,  so  that  the  rate  was  one  for  each  175  trains 
run.  They  ran  during  the  same  period  644  trains  with  over  25  cars 
without  accident. 

"On  the  Atchison,  Topeka  &  Santa  Fe,  from  August,  1912,  to 
January  31,  1913,  there  were  19,407  trains  run  with  25  cars  or  less. 
There  were  128  accidents  to  these  trains,  or  one  to  every  152  trains 
run.  There  were  22,348  trains  run  with  more  than  25  cars.  There 
were  123  accidents  to  these  trains,  or  one  to  each   182  trains  run. 

"A  significant  fact  in  connection  with  these  accidents  is,  that 
while  a  large  per  cent  of  the  smaller  trains  were  equipped  with  an 
additional  man,  61  of  the  128  accidents  were  due  to  errors  of  em- 
ployees. On  the  heavier  trains,  and  greater  total  number  run,  there 
were  but  44  due  to  that  cause. 

"The  Chicago,  Rock  Island  &  Pacific,  reporting  for  six  months 
ending  December  31,  1912,  shows  56  accidents  to  trains  having  less 


31 

than  25  cars,  or  one  for  each  103  trains  run,  and  88  accidents  to 
trains  having  more  than  25  cars,  or  one  for  each  122  trains  run. 
"They  also  show  a  much  larger  number  of  accidents  due  to  errors 
of  employees  on  the  smaller  trains  than  the  large  ones ;  the  figures 
being  54  on  the  smaller  and  17  on  the  larger  trains." 

While  the  available  evidence  is  not  finally  destructive  of  the  claim 
that  a  number  of  the  accidents  in  train  service  is  due  to  the  employ- 
ment of  too  few  men,  yet  the  presumption  from  all  the  evidence 
is  so  strongly  to  the  contrary  that  it  throws  the  burden  of  proof 
upon  those  who  make  the  statement.  Thus  far  they  have  presented 
no  specific  evidence  in  support  of  their  contention. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  is  the  unanimous  opinion  of  railway  operat- 
ing officers  that  an  increase  in  the  number  of  men  normally  em- 
ployed on  trains  will  tend  to  increase  the  number  of  accidents  not 
only  to  individual  employees,  but  to  the  trains  themselves.  It  will 
either  result  in  a  dangerous  division  of  responsibility  or  else  in  an 
idle  and  unnecessary  man  becoming  a  hindrance  to  other  employees 
in  the  performance  of  their  duties.  Replies  received  in  1909  by  the 
Special  Committee  on  the  Relation  of  Railway  Legislation  to  Opera- 
tion from  railways  operating  in  states  where  train-crew  legislation 
had  been  passed  were  unanimous  in  expressing  the  view  that  no 
duties  were  performed  by  the  extra  man  on  a  train  that  could  not 
be  performed  by  the  other  employees.  It  was,  moreover,  the  unani- 
mous opinion  that  the  legislation  did  not  and  would  not  increase 
safety,  while  many  expressed  the  opinion  that  it  was  bound  to  have 
the  opposite  effect. 

Accidents  to  all  Persons. 

Larger  train  crews  are  urged,  not  only  in  behalf  of  the  safety  of 
trainmen,  but  also  for  the  further  reason  that  they  would  increase 
the  safety  of  the  traveling  public  and  of  railway  employees  other 
than  trainmen.  With  respect  to  that  claim,  an  analysis  of  the  causes 
of  accidents  to  railway  employees,  passengers,  trespassers,  and  other 
persons  is  shown  in  Table  III.  It  will  be  seen  that  more  than  half 
of  the  casualties  to  passengers  are  due  to  collisions  and  derailments, 
which  have  been  considered.  As  .to  the  other  casualties,  there  is  no 
indication  that  the  size  of  the  train  crew  was  a  factor  in  their  cause. 


32 


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33 


Train-creiv  Legislation  as  Affecting  the  Provision  of  Safety 

Appliances. 

There  is  another  side  to  this  question  of  the  effect  of  full  train- 
crew  laws  on  safety.  If  it  be  admitted  that  train-crew  legislation  is 
unnecessary, -it  must  then  be  granted  that  such  legislation  not  only 
will  not  promote  safety,  but  may  by  reason  of  its  expense  be  an 
actual  obstruction  in  the  way  of  the  development  of  greater  safety 
of  the  railways  of  the  country.  The  Interstate  Commerce  Commis- 
sion has  frequently  called  attention  to  the  need  for  physical  improve- 
ments. In  its  annual  report  for  1912  it  directs  attention  to  condi- 
tions of  track  and  equipment  that  lead  to  derailments,  and  recom- 
mends the  universal  installation  of  the  block  system  as  a  means  of 
reducing  collisions.  The  improvement  of  track  and  equipment  and 
the  installation  of  block-signal  systems  and  other  physical  improve- 
ments can  be  made  only  by  the  investment  of  a  large  amount  of  cap- 
ital. As  has  been  shown,  the  railways  estimate  that  train-crew 
legislation  applying  throughout  the  country  would  increase  railway 
expenses  to  the  extent  of  from  $13,000,000  to  $20,000,000  per  year. 
The  former  amount  is  the  annual  interest  at  5  per  cent  on  $260,- 
000,000 ;  the  latter  on  $400,000,000.  It  has  been  estimated  by  the 
Special  Committee  on  the  Relation  of  Railway  Operation  to  Legis- 
lation that  for  $260,000,000  block-signal  systems  could  be  installed 
on  all  railway  mileage  of  the  United  States  not  now  so  equipped — 
in  other  words,  train-crew  legislation  would  cost  the  railroads  at 
least  as  much  as  the  universal  installation  of  the  block-signal  system. 

Railway  officers  contend  that  net  earnings  are  insufficient  even 
now  to  enable  them  to  make  these  needed  physical  improvements. 
On  this  point  the  Block  Signal  and  Train  Control  Board  created  by 
Congress  to  investigate  appliances  for  the  promotion  of  safety  of 
railroad  operation,  in  its  final  report  to  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission,  on  June  29,  1912,  said: 

"In  discussing  this  subject  it  may  be  assumed  at  the  outset  that 
railroad  officers  and  employees  are  as  anxious  to  do  everything  in 
their  power  to  promote  safety  as  the  public  is  to  have  safeguards 
provided,  and  that  railroad  officials  and  employees  are  not  immune 
to  the  horrors  of  a  terrible  wreck.  If  all  think  alike  and  have  the 
same  desire,  why  are  not  better  safeguards  provided?  The  general 
answer  for  most  railroads  is  the  expense  involved.  Money  is  not 
available  with  which  to  provide  and  install  the  apparatus.  It  is 
needed  elsewhere." 


TRAIN-CREW  LEGISLATION  \^ETOED  BY  GOVERNORS. 

In  conclusion,  there  are  appended  messages  accompanying  vetoes 
of  train-crew  bills  by  Governor  Cruce  of  Oklahoma,  in  1913,  and 
Governor  Hughes  of  New  York,  1907 ;  and  extracts  from  veto 
messages  of  Governor  Dix  of  New  York,  191 1,  and  Governor  Foss 
of  Massachusetts,  1912. 

Governor  Crucc's  J^eto  Message — 1913. 

"I  have  studied  this  bill  from  every  angle,  and  the  more  I  have 
studied  it  the  more  I  have  become  convinced  that  it  should  not 
receive  my  approval.  In  the  enactment  of  this  bill  it  is  only  the 
railway  companies  and  their  employees  that  have  been  considered. 
The  thousands  of  people  in  this  State  who  travel  upon  the  rail- 
roads and  ship  their  products  and  merchandise  over  same  have  not 
entered  into  the  discussion.  This  fact,  however,  must  remain  after 
all  has  been  said,  that  every  dollar  of  expense  placed  upon  railway 
corporations  in  Oklahoma  will  ultimately  be  paid  by  those  who 
patronize  the  railroads.  The  cost  of  putting  this  bill  into  operation 
is  estimated  by  the  corporation  commission  at  something  like  $250,- 
000,  while  the  cost  is  estimated  by  the  railroad  companies  at  more 
than  $400,000.  But  whether  it  be  $100,000  or  $500,000,  that  amount 
in  the  end  will  be  paid  by  those  who  use  the  railroads.  Another 
thing  I  have  learned  to  believe  is  that  those  who  have  made  a  life- 
time study  of  railroad  operations  are  better  judges  of  the  proper 
method  of  operating  them  than  I  am,  and  I  believe  that  this  is 
equally  true  when  applied  to  a  majority  of  the  members  of  any  legis- 
lative body.  The  trouble  in  Oklahoma  is  and  has  ever  been  that  in 
dealing  with  public  service  corporations  we  have  assumed  to  know 
more  about  how  properly  to  operate  them  than  those  who  have 
given  the  matter  careful  study.  Public  service  corporations  need 
to  be  regulated  and  need  to  be  controlled.  Oklahoma  has  under- 
taken to  do  this  by  the  creation  of  a  corporation  commission,  and 
has  clothed  that  commission  with  vmusual  authority  in  dealing  with 
such  matters.  That  commission,  after  having  studied  this  question, 
is  better  able  to  place  suitable  regulations  upon  the  railroads  than 
is  the  governor  or  the  legislature. 

"The  practical  effect  of  this  bill  would  be  to  give  employment  to 
a  number  of  railroad  men  without  increasing  the  efficiency  of  the 

(34) 


35 

service,  and  would  be  supplying  positions  for  three  men  to  do  the 
work  that  can  be  done  by  two.  It  is  in  entire  harmony  with  the 
principle  that  has  prevailed  in  this  State  of  creating  an  army  of 
officials  to  do  the  work  that  ought  to  be  done  by  half  that  number 
of  men.  This  legislature  has  set  itself  to  the  task  of  reducing  the 
number  of  officials  drawing  salaries  from  the  State,  and  a  Herculean 
task  it  is  proving.  It  is  certainly  inconsistent,  while  trying  to  curtail 
the  number  of  useless  public  officials,  to  increase  the  number  of 
appointed  employees,  who  in  the  end  must  draw  their  subsistence 
from  the  same  source  that  is  now  drawn  upon  by  these  useless 
public  employees." 

Governor  Hughes'  Veto  Message — iQoy. 

"I  return  herewith,  without  my  approval.  Assembly  Bill  No.  455 
(Senate  Reprint  No.  1338),  entitled  'An  act  to  better  protect  the 
lives  of  railroad  employees.' 

"This  bill  provides  that  it  shall  be  unlawful  for  any  railroad  com- 
pany in  the  State  of  New  York  'that  runs  more  than  four  freight 
trains  in  twenty-four  hours'  to  run  over  any  part  of  its  road  outside 
of  yard  limits  any  freight  train  composed  of  more  than  twenty  cars 
with  less  than  a  full  crew  of  six  persons,  to-wit:  one  engineer,  one 
fireman,  one  conductor,  and  three  brakemen ;  or  a  light  engine  with- 
out cars,  without  a  crew  composed  of  one  engineer,  one  fireman, 
one  conductor  or  flagman,  when  running  a  distance  of  ten  miles  or 
more  from  starting  point. 

"According  to  present  practice,  freight  trains  are  very  generally 
operated  with  a  crew  of  five  persons,  and  the  object  of  this  bill  is 
to  compel  the  employment  of  an  additional  brakeman.  The  neces- 
sity for  this  is  said  to  lie  in  the  fact  that  without  three  brakemen 
the  freight  trains  are  insufficiently  manned,  and  that  firemen  are 
compelled  to  leave  their  places  in  all  kinds  of  weather  to  throw 
switches  'when  the  two  brakemen  are  required  respectively  to  go 
ahead  of  and  behind  the  train. 

"This  bill,  however,  upon  the  facts  developed  before  me  upon 
the  hearing  and  undisputed,  is  clearly  unconstitutional.  Such  a 
measure  should  define  the  service  required,  with  suitable  reference 
to  circumstances  and  conditions,  so  that  the  taw  would  apply  in 
proper  cases  and  not  otherwise.  The  bill  takes  no  account  of  the 
difiference  between  the  different  roads  and  parts  of  roads,  in  track- 


36 

age  and  switching  facilities,  and  of  the  fact  that  what  may  be  neces- 
sary in  the  case  of  some  railroads  may  be  wholly  unnecessary  in 
others.  In  the  case  of  the  New  York  Central  Railroad  it  was  shown 
that  the  trackage  and  switching  facilities  on  its  main  line  were  of 
such  a  character  as  to  make  unnecessary  the  employment  of  a  third 
brakeman  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  bill.  This  was 
frankly  conceded  by  supporters  of  the  bill. 

"To  require  the  expenditure  of  a  very  large  amount  of  money 
(estimated  at  several  hundred  thousand  dollars  annually)  without 
necessity  for  the  outlay  is  simply  arbitrary  exaction  and  a  taking 
of  property  without  due  process  of  law.  The  bill  does  not  refer  its 
requirements  to  any  proper  standard  of  necessity  or  provide  any 
criterion  by  which  its  proper  application,  under  varying  conditions, 
is  to  be  determined.  It  contains  an  absolute  requirement  which, 
upon  the  facts  conceded  before  me,  cannot  be  justified." 

Governor  Dix's  Veto  Message — igii. 

"This  bill  is  objectionable  for  the  reason  that  it  takes  away  from 
the  Public  Service  Commission  a  right  which  it  now  has  for  the 
proper  regulation  of  railroads." 

Governor  Foss's  Veto  Message — 1^12. 

Governor  Foss  vetoed  a  train-crew  bill  passed  by  the  Massachu- 
setts Legislature  in  191 2  on  the  ground  that  the  public  interest  in 
such  matters  of  detail  in  railway  operation  cannot  be  well  protected 
by  means  of  special  arbitrary  legislative  enactments,  but  should  be 
entrusted  to  an  expert  regulative  commission.     He  said : 

"I  cannot  pass  judgment  upon  the  question  as  to  whether  or  not 
all  freight  trains  of  thirty  cars  should  carry  crews  of  six  men,  and 
all  trains  of  twenty-nine  cars  five  men.  These  matters  can,  in  my 
judgment,  be  determined  only  by  a  permanent  and  powe^rful  com- 
mission of  experts  skilled  in  railroad  operation  and  regulation." 


ADDENDUM. 

As  stated  on  page  i8,  under  date  of  July  9,  1913,  a  letter  reading 
as  below  was  sent  by  registered  mail  to  the  respective  headquarters 
of— 

Mr.  Warren  S.  Stone,  Grand  Chief  Engineer,  Brotherhood  of  Loco- 
motive Engineers. 

Mr.  W.  S.  Carter,  President,  Brotherhood  of  Locomotive  Firemen 
and  Enginemen. 

Mr.  A.  B.  Garretson,  President,  Order  of  Railway  Conductors. 

Mr.  W.  G.  Lee,  President,  Brotherhood  of  Railroad  Trainmen. 

Dear  Sir:  The  Bureau  of  Railway  Economics  has  under  way  a 
study  of  train-crew  legislation,  proposed  for  issue  as  one  of  its 
bulletins. 

In  all  of  its  studies  the  bureau  is  committed  to  fairness,  accuracy, 
and  thoroughness.  In  this  study  it  especially  desires  to  adhere  to 
these  fundamental  principles  of  its  procedure,  and  is  therefore  seek- 
ing information  from  every  source  that  may  tend  to  impart  these 
qualities  to  this  bulletin. 

In  the  thought  that  you  may  be  interested  in  the  subject,  a  first 
page-proof  of  the  bulletin  is  enclosed  for  your  scrutiny.  If  you 
have  the  time  and  the  inclination  to  read  this,  as, I  hope  you  will,  we 
shall  be  very  glad  to  have  your  comments,  criticisms,  and  sug- 
gestions. We  especially  desire  definite,  specific,  and  substantiated 
information  such  as  may  not  have  come  to  our  attention  that  bears 
upon  the  merits  of  the  questions  discussed. 
Yours  very  truly, 
(Signed)  L.  G.  McPherson, 

Director  of  the  Bureau. 

Under  date  of  July  12th,  Mr.  Carter  replied  "that  so  far  mem- 
bers of  this  organization  have  not  seriously  endeavored  to  secure 
'full  train-crew'  legislation  for  firemen." 

Under  date  of  August  4th,  Mr.  Garretson  replied:  "I  have  not 
yet  had  time  to  go  through  the  document  in  question,  owing  to 
press  of  other  business  incident  to  a  long-continued  absence  from 
my  office." 

Up  to  October  6,  the  day  this  bulletin  is  placed  upon  the  press, 
no  reply  has  been  received  from  either  Mr.  Stone  or  Mr.  Lee. 

(37) 


BULLETINS  OF  THE 
BUREAU  OF  RAILWAY  ECONOMICS 

(Continued  from  page  2  of  cover.) 

28.  Eflfect  of  Recent  Wage  Advances  upon  Railway  Employees'  Ck>inpen8atleB 

during  the  Year  Ending  June  30,  1911. 
Variations  in  the  Number  of  Railway  Employees,  190&-1910-1911. 
Relation  of  the  Number  of  Employees  and  their  Compensation  to  Traffic 

and  Revenue.  1909-1910-1911. 

29.  Summary  of  Revenues  and  Expenses  of  Steam  Roads  in  the  United  State* 

for  December,  1911. 

30.  Summary  of  Revenues  and  Expenses  of  Steam  Roads  In  the  United  States 

for  January,  1912. 

31.  Railway  Traffic  Statistics,  1900-1910. 

32.  Summary  of  Revenues  and  Expenses  of  Steam  Roads  in  the  United  State« 

for  February,  1912. 

33.  Summary  of  Revenues  and  Expenses  of  Steam  Roads  in  the  United  States 

for  March,  1912. 

34.  A  Comparative  Study  of  Railway  Wages  and  the  Cost  of  Living  in  the 

United  States,  the  United  Kingdom,  and  the  Principal  Countries  of 
Continental  Europe. 

35.  Summary  of  Revenues  and  Expenses  of  Steam  Roads  In  the  United  States 

for  April,  1912. 

36.  Summary  of  Revenues  and  Expenses  of  Steam  Roads  in  the  United  States 

for  May,  1912. 

37.  Sunmiary  of  Revenues  and  Expenses  of  Steam  Roads  in  the  United  States 

for  June,  1912. 

38.  Summary  of  Revenues  and  Expenses  of  Steam  Roads  in  the  United  States 

for  July,  1912. 

39.  Comparison  of-  Capital  Values — Agriculture,  Manufactures,  and  the  Rail- 

waya 

40.  Summary  of  Revenues  and  Expenses  of  Steam  Roads  In  the  United  States 

for  August,  1912. 

41.  Summary  of  Revenues  and  Expenses  of  Steam  Roads  in  the  United  States 

for  September,  1912. 

42.  Summary  of  Revenues  and  Expenses  of  Steam  Roads  In  the  United  States 

for  October,  1912.  * 

43.  Summary  of  Revenues  and  Expenses  of  Steam  Roads  In  the  United  States 

for  November,  1912. 

44.  Summary  of  Revenues  and  Expenses  of  Steam  Roads  In  the  United  States 

for  December,  1912. 

45.  Railways  and  Agriculture.  190O-1910. 

46.  Summary  of  Revenues  and  Expenses  of  Steam  Roads  in  the  United  States 

for  January,  1913.» 

47.  Summary  of  Revenues  and  Expenses  of  Steam  Roads  in  the  United  States 

for  February,  1913. 

48.  Summary  of  Revenues  and  Expenses  of  Steam  Roads  in  the  United  States 

for  March,  1913. 

49.  Summary  of  Revenues  and  Expenses  of  Steam  Roads  in  the  United  States 

for  April,  1913. 

50.  Summary  of  Revenues  and  Expenses  of  Steam  Roads  in  the  United  States 

for  May,  1913. 

51.  Summary  of  Revenues  and  Expenses  of  Steam  Roads  in  the  United  States 

for  June,  1913. 

52.  Summary  of  Revenues  and  Expenses  of  Steam  Roads  in  the  United  States 

for  July,  1913. 

53.  The  Aricuments  For  and  Against  Traln-Crew  Legislation. 


THE  LIBRARY 

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